


07 DEC 1988

Deputy Director For Requirements and Evaluation  
Intelligence Community Staff  
Washington, D.C. 20505



STAT

ICS 7206-88  
5 December 1988

NOTE FOR: DDR&E Task Force

SUBJECT: Private Help

Attached is a draft short item on a subject of great concern to me; i.e., the impact on US intelligence if "the cold war is over." My opinion is that we need to have a story about this issue, and sooner the better.

I would appreciate any feedback--especially improvements--on the Soviet dimension of this issue.

But most of all I am interested in knowing reactions to and substantive help on the key point; i.e., exactly what is the impact?

Thanks for your help.



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Attachment:  
As Stated

cc: D/PBO  
D/PPO

*This maybe overkill but it  
does a job,*

SUBJECT: Private Help

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**A SPECULATIVE LOOK:  
THE IMPACT ON US INTELLIGENCE IF "THE COLD WAR IS OVER"**

Introduction

- o This short point paper addresses an issue--the impact on intelligence--that gets lost regularly in any treatment or discussion of the basic idea: what if the classic US-USSR cold war is over?
  - This paper addresses the key pieces of the topic in sequential fashion; all pieces are included to ensure the reader has all of the pieces at hand and can keep all of the ideas in mind.
- o The punchline is that the USSR may seem to be internally-directed and relatively easier to deal with, but the Soviet military--which gets most of US intelligence's attention and money--is being maintained and modernized apace. Soviet diplomacy and other important topics, such as nationalities' unrest and economic performance, are growing in importance to US policy officers and, thus, to US Intelligence.
- o As a result, US intelligence is in a more stressful situation than most people recognize: the USSR's many on-going changes require US Intelligence to stay abreast of them, but Soviet public diplomacy is feeding domestic pressures in the West to reduce defense costs--including intelligence.

Fundamental Change in Soviet Foreign Policy

- o What is happening today in the Soviet Union is tantamount to an earthquake in terms of its political and economic magnitude.
- o Soviet policy, foreign and domestic, has taken on a relatively more benign cast in public since Gorbachev's coming to power in 1985.
- o A case can be made that this will continue and intensify as Soviet leadership is preoccupied increasingly with internal affairs.
- o These changes may be fragile.
  - They depend to a large extent on the person of Mikhail Gorbachev.
  - Internal instability (brought on by reforms that reduce the privileges of the nomenklatura, nationalities problems, and/or difficulties created when consumer expectations are unmet) may trigger replacement of Gorbachev and reversal of current policies.

Likely Trends in Soviet Behavior

- o The Soviets are ending the 1980s and moving towards the 1990s with a more sophisticated diplomatic policy in place--one that is publicly defended in terms calculated to appeal to US friends and allies. Expect:

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- Bold tactical moves initiated from the top.
  - Arms control: Sudden changes in position, unanticipated even by Soviet negotiating teams.
  - Human rights: e.g., International Human Rights Conference proposed for Moscow in 1991.
  - Foreign policy initiatives in the Third World: e.g., agreement to withdraw from Afghanistan.
- Skillful use of public diplomacy, especially in West Europe.
- o At the same time--and despite some public announcements that appear to be a softening of the military hard-line--the Soviets continue to:
  - Maintain their existing military strength.
  - Invest in advanced new capabilities for the future.
- o However, some changes may occur:
  - The Soviet military likely will have to live with at least a bit less and do more with what they have.
  - A public shift in strategic doctrine to "reasonable sufficiency" was announced some time ago, although the change has not yet been manifest in military exercises.
- o Evidence to date indicates that Soviet support for the military in terms of quantity and quality of weapons continues unabated.
  - Deployment of strategic forces first built during late 1970s and 1980s continues.
  - It will take a decade or more for any changes to significantly affect the strategic military balance.
  - The Soviets are now making critical new investments in advanced technologies for new weapons and modernizations.

#### Ramifications for US Policy

- o It has become more difficult to predict Soviet behavior and formulate effective policy responses.
  - Soviet policymaking on key issues is more susceptible to sudden tactical changes.
  - Reform movements and resulting instabilities in Soviet domestic politics have unpredictable effects on Soviet foreign and security policies.

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- o Moscow is engaging the West, not just the US, on a wider range of issues than before:
  - Arms control is still the central or sole public focus of US-Soviet relations.
  - Economics and trade, are especially key in Soviet relations with West Europe, Japan, and China.
  - Scientific and technical exchanges are increasing sharply.
- o US relations with other countries (especially Third World friends and allies) are growing more complicated as the Soviets seek to portray themselves as less threatening and willing to pursue better bilateral relations through trade and other exchanges.

#### Implications for US Intelligence

- o Policymakers' needs are increasing in support of a broader range of US-Soviet policy interactions (arms control, trade, scientific and educational exchanges) and to help assess a more fluid situation inside the USSR.
- o At the same time, the need to cover the Soviet military, especially changes in strategic and conventional force postures, is consuming even more technical and analytical resources.
  - This problem is at least as difficult as before glasnost.
    - It is unlikely that reforms will be successful enough in the next decade to have much impact on Moscow's basic military capabilities.
    - Secrecy persists in Soviet defense programs, particularly in advanced technology weapons development.
  - Assessing Soviet military capabilities is the most expensive thing we do today--and the need for costly new investments is likely to persist as the Soviets continue to move toward modern, advanced technology weapons for the future.
- o Because the Soviet political and economic earthquake is coupled with glasnost, data about the Soviet Union is virtually hemorrhaging everywhere, including--but not limited to--public documents.
  - Personal contacts of US Government officials and private citizens with Soviet counterparts are likely to expand even more.
    - The new Soviet "openness" makes more Soviet officials available and they are more willing to talk to foreigners.

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- At the same time, this gives the Soviets more opportunities to affect US policymaking, including trying to shape views through "private" discussions.
- This extra volume of data could lessen the apparent value of data acquired through more sensitive sources and methods.
- All of this underscores the need for enhanced capabilities to handle and assess this dramatic increase in data.